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D’s book presents a case against Moral Rationalism or the thesis of Supremacy, which 
is that “if one has a moral requirement to , one thereby has a practical, normative, 
obligation to ” (2). This thesis, according to D, is widely accepted in the history of 
philosophy as well as in contemporary ethics. Against moral rationalism D argues that 
“the fact that a given action is required from the moral point of view does not by itself 
settle whether one ought to perform it, or even whether performing it is in the most 
important sense permissible” (2). The book’s most provocative upshot is the claim 
that it can, sometimes and for some agents, be irrational to do what morality requires. 
The book can be divided into three parts. The first is introductory. D explains 
his conceptual framework (ch.1), and argues against a priori moral rationalism (ch.2), 
the claim “that the truth of Supremacy can be known independently of substantive, 
first-order theorizing about the content of moral/practical reasons and requirements” 
(40). According to this position, moral rationalism is not a possible outcome of ethical 
enquiry but a “limiting condition on first-order inquiry” (40) that could show that 
certain moral theories that do not respect Supremacy fail. For D’s case against a priori 
moral rationalism as well as for his subsequent arguments, the intuition that at least 
sometimes moral requirements conflict with non-moral requirements and have to 
normatively compete with them is pivotal. D argues that any property that delivers a 
meaningful explanation for the supposed supremacy of morality should rather be 
understood as a property that attaches to all-things-considered oughts, not morality 
per se. This allows us to explain why there is genuine competition between moral and 
other reasons, and why it seems that sometimes morality does not win this 
competition. The upshot of D’s discussion of a priori rationalism is that in order to 
decide whether Supremacy is true, we need a substantive inquiry into whether the 
content of moral oughts lines up with what we, all-things-considered, should do.  
In the second argumentative unit, D presents two arguments against substantive 
moral rationalism, which he sees as a greater challenge then a priori moral 
rationalism. Substantive moral rationalism holds that inquiry into the content of 
morality reveals that what we morally ought to do and what we ought to do all-things-
considered always happens to coincide. D seeks to drive a wedge between moral 
oughts and what we have all-things-considered most reason to do. The first of his two 
main arguments for this (ch.3) starts from the Principle of Moral Impartiality, 
according to which, other things being equal, all persons are of equal moral 
importance and their interests “generate moral reasons of strength proportional 
to the extent that the persons whose interests they are, are morally important” 
(72). D considers this principle “of substantial prima facie plausibility” for morality 
(74). He argues that two standard objections against impartiality, the 
Overdemandingness and the ‘Nearest and Dearest’ objections, do not discredit 
impartiality as a moral principle. In fact, they show that  
 
we lack decisive practical reasons to conform to impartial demands. Thus the 
arguments on offer here […] become the crucial first-order inquiry into Reasons-as-
such sufficient for a rejection of moral rationalism given an impartial account of the 
moral point of view (77).  
 
Since impartiality is intuitively plausible as a moral principle and moral rationalism 
should not be accepted as an a priori constraint on morality, we should accept 
impartiality but also accept that it is sometimes rational to do something other than 
what morality commands, because the impartial commands of morality can 
excessively infringe on our own well-being and our relationships to others. This 
picture best accommodates our considered judgments about what is moral and 
rational.  
The second, independent, main argument (ch.4) is less straightforward. In a 
nutshell (because to do it justice would require too much space), D argues that moral 
anti-rationalism better accommodates than other theories that there are 
supererogatory acts or rationally permitted actions that are not morally best even 
though morally we must always perform the morally best action. 
So far D has established that we are not always rationally required to conform to 
moral commands. In the third and final argumentative unit he takes his anti-
rationalism one step further by arguing that “some people are, sometimes, under some 
conditions, normatively required to act immorally” (137). D’s argument proceeds in 
two steps. Firstly, he argues (ch.5) that at “the default level of practical rationality, 
people have normative permission to conform to moral demands” (137). In a second 
step (ch.6), he argues that the rational permission to always act morally only holds on 
a default level or “prior to any amplification or strengthening given the normative 
significance of self” (191). The notion of the normative significance of self expresses 
the idea that an agent can place “himself under the enhanced authority of reasons” 
(188). Commitments, ground projects or existential changes can “strengthen 
preexisting reasons in comparison to their default strength” (187). If Supremacy is 
false, agents will sometimes on a default level have rational permission to act 
immorally. If agents can also reinforce non-moral reasons, then these reasons should 
be sufficient to make the immoral act, in some cases, not only permissible but also 
rationally required for this agent.  
D’s own example (borrowed from Sartre) might help to illustrate this: If I am to 
make a choice between caring for my elderly mother or joining the resistance against 
Nazi occupation, it could be the case that impartiality the best thing I could do is join 
the resistance. I thus morally ought to do it. Intuitively, however, it is rationally 
permissible to do both: care for my mother, since I have special, partial commitments 
towards her, and join the resistance. Moral anti-Rationalism endorses this intuition 
and holds that both options are rationally permissible. Once I have chosen to care for 
my mother, I placed myself under the enhanced authority of partial reasons, because I 
chose to be the person who cares for sick and elderly relatives rather than join a 
resistance group. Reinforcing these partial reasons might imply that if, in the future, I 
am confronted with the choice between staying with my mother or joining the 
resistance, all else being equal (the resistance does not need me more or less than 
before), it might now be rationally obligatory for me to stay with my mother and 
irrational to join the resistance, even though the latter is still the morally best choice. I 
have to stay with my mother, since due to my commitments my reasons to care for her 
are reinforced to such an extent that they do not ground merely a permission but an 
obligation – they are now much stronger than my moral reasons. 
 
Let me begin my critical evaluation with registering a worry. D takes great care to 
ensure that his theory of rationality matches our intuitions about what is all-things-
considered rational. He is far less interested in having his conception of morality 
match our intuitions of what is moral. Whilst I agree that impartiality, in abstract, is 
an incredibly intuitive principle, it is easy to construct cases in which the impartial 
option is not merely different from the overall rational option but also from what we 
firmly believe to be the moral option. If we could maximize the impartial good by 
torturing an innocent person then, at least on many ways of fleshing this case out, we 
think it would be immoral to do so. In this situation, it would not be the case that we 
think torturing the innocent would be morally obligatory but irrational. Whilst D does 
not present a straightforwardly Consequentialist account of morality, for instance, he 
wants organ harvesting ruled out (141), he is generally dismissive of absolute 
prohibitions (119).  
One promising way to argue against Moral anti-Rationalism would therefore 
be to demand that ethics must take intuitions concerning intrinsically bad 
actions and absolute (or near absolute) prohibitions as seriously as those 
pointing to impartiality. This would, ideally, lead to a theory of morality and 
rationality that is in line with our moral intuitions as well as our intuitions about 
what is all-things-considered rational. It seems likely that such a theory would 
show much greater correspondence between morality and rationality than a 
theory on which morality is conceived of as revisionary whereas rationality 
tracks our intuitions. Such a theory would considerably undermine D’s 
arguments that are supposed to drive a wedge between morality and all-things-
considered rationality. One might be even be tempted to turn D’s case upside 
down: What he shows is that you cannot be both an impartialist and a moral 
rationalist. You have to give up one. D thinks it is moral rationalism, but those 
who are less convinced than D that impartiality is the most central normative 
principle for morality might rather consider D’s case for anti-Rationalist as 
further ammunition against strict impartiality. 
I will close this review with a discussion of what D acknowledges as the main 
objection and critically evaluate his responses. This will also help us understand what 
some of the normative and applied applications of Moral anti-Rationalism are.  
Moral anti-Rationalism threatens to make morality ineffective in reducing 
inequality. The rich presumably grow up in ways that make it more likely that they 
develop expensive habits and hobbies that become part of what makes their lives 
worth living. It seems that on an anti-rationalist framework they have greater rational 
prerogatives (maybe even rational obligations) to indulge themselves. This is bad 
news for a conception that conceives of morality as impartial and as a tool for 
achieving more equality. D admits that he is “really bothered” (203) by this 
“extremely powerful” (203) objection and that this problem “keeps [him] up at night” 
(172). In response he makes two suggestions. The first one is political: If Moral 
Rationalism is false than we should not expect that the solution to inequality is simply 
a moral one. He considers anti-Rationalism rather “a further reason to insist on a 
progressive account of distributive justice” (204-5) and for institutional change such 
as “progressive taxation of extreme luxury for the benefit of the poor” (204). The 
problem I see with this is that anti-Rationalism places the burden to push for 
progressive change chiefly and maybe exclusively on the marginalized and politically 
powerless, since for the powerful it might be rationally permissible, maybe even 
rationally obligatory, to oppose anything that might force them to share their wealth. 
This is particularly problematic given that current political systems are organized in 
such a way that those who are most likely to have a rational obligation to oppose 
change, namely, those who benefit most from the status quo, are in the strongest 
position to influence the course of politics. 
D’s second suggestion is education. Given  
 the structure of morality, it would seem there is substantial moral pressure to shape the 
education of the younger generation in a particular way: to attempt as best one can, to 
align the interests of the younger generation to moral interests such that, over time, the 
tendency for conflict between personal projects, prudence, etc., and morality – even an 
impartial morality – is reduced (205-6).  
 
The appeal to the “structure of morality” is mysterious here, since the very idea of D’s 
book is that whilst the structure of morality might be impartiality, this does not result 
in rational obligations and not even necessarily rational permissions. In addition, there 
are two further issues for D’s proposal on an anti-Rationalist framework. Firstly, D 
stresses that his argument entails that when deliberating about morally relevant 
scenarios we should look not only at the commands of morality: “how we ought to 
live is in large measure up to us. Of course, it is not entirely up to us. We still can’t 
murder strangers for the sake of a quick buck no matter how much we identify with 
doing so” (202). The pedagogical doctrine that would follow from this should be one 
that, whilst it imbues children with respect for certain moral norms and prohibitions, 
above everything fosters agents’ capacity to autonomy and independent decision 
making, not their regard for impartiality. Surely, agents must be able to take up an 
impartial perspective. After all, D does not mean to deny that this perspective matters, 
but ultimately the anti-Rationalist education should emphasize autonomy over 
impartiality or equality. This might not necessarily be implausible as a pedagogical 
approach, but it is not what D hopes for. Secondly, there is also the worry that parents 
would have to become hypocrites. If they acknowledge that it is the right thing to 
educate their children to be moral then shouldn’t they also acknowledge the central 
value of morality for their own lives? We sometimes do say (jokingly or not): “Do as 
I say, not as I do!”, but can we also say: “Value as I say, not as I value?” There has to 
be a point at which a rebellious and bright pupil will ask: “Well why don’t you value 
as you say?” and the anti-Rationalist response would be: “I acknowledge the value of 
morality for your generation but not (always) for me and there is nothing rationally 
deficient about this.”. This might be something the anti-Rationalist can say, but there 
is, I take it, a strong intuition that it is indeed very deficient if you value morality as 
supreme for others to have but not for yourself to live by. D’s attempt to side-step the 
full brunt of the main objection against Moral anti-Rationalism rather brings out 
further unwelcome implications of his view. 
In sum, D’s book is very clearly written and tightly argued, it does argue for a 
controversial and innovative non-mainstream position, and it neither hides 
unwelcome implications of this position nor the appeal of alternative view points, 
with which D engages in great detail. It will make valuable reading for everyone 
working on the status and value of morality and on practical rationality. In particular, 
D’s critical discussions of current a priori and substantive forms of Moral Rationalism 
constitute serious challenges for Moral Rationalists to overcome. 
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